ON THE ALLOCATION OF RESIDENTS TO RURAL HOSPITALS - A GENERAL PROPERTY OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS

被引：191

作者：

ROTH, AE

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913160

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：425 / 427

页数：3

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[3]

Knuth D., 1976, MARIAGES STABLES

[4] COMMON AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS [J].

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[8] MISREPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM [J].

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[9]

Shapley L. S., 1972, International Journal of Game Theory, V1, P111

[10]

SUNDARSHAN A, 1981, NEW ENGLAND J MED, V305, P525