INEFFICIENCY OF SMOOTH MARKET MECHANISMS

被引：15

作者：

DUBEY, P ^{[1
]}

ROGAWSKI, JD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 19卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(90)90004-S

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the efficiency properties of an abstractly given market mechanism. This consists of a smooth map from traders' strategy-choices to their net trades. When the number of traders is finite (the oligopolistic case), it is shown that Nash equilibria 'tend to be' inefficient for generic utilities. The phenomenon is analyzed via a certain set of 'optimal points' that are determined solely by the mechanism. In the last section we apply our results to the Hurwicz and Shapely-Shubik mechanisms by way of an illustration. © 1990.

引用

页码：285 / 304

页数：20

共 10 条

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