CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS OF INERTIA SUPERGAMES

被引：5

作者：

CHAKRABARTI, SK

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202, 516 Cavanaugh Hall

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1990年 / 51卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(90)90056-P

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

An inertia supergame is one in which changing strategies over time is not merely costly, but the cost incurred by any player in changing strategies is greater than any gains made in a single period. Complete characterizations of the set of payoffs of the perfect equilibrium points, as well as the set of payoffs of strong, perfect equilibrium points of the inertia supergame, are given. We also find that if one allows for the right correlating device then the correlated α-core is the topological closure of the set of payoffs of the strong, perfect equilibrium point of the inertia supergame. © 1990.

引用

页码：171 / 183

页数：13

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