EUROPEAN-COMMUNITY LOBBYING

Abstract. During the late 1980s, direct lobbying of EC institutions became an increasingly important part of the decision‐making process within the Community. Such lobbying strengthens EC autonomy over the interests of member states. Today the system is characterized by unclear principles regulating interest representation and is open to lobbying by many different actors in relation to a range of issues. It tends to be easier for lobbyists to influence technicalities than to advocate general principles. In technical questions, the representatives of industry or affected social interests seem to have more legitimacy when lobbying the Commission. The lobbying pattern varies according to policy areas, for example, between the agriculture and the financial sector. We assume that, in a representative EC system where the parliamentary chain of command is the core, interest representation will have to be more regularized. Thus, corporatist structures is likely to increase in importance, at the expense of the lobbying patterns of late 1980s and early 1990s. Copyright © 1991, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved