TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

被引:53
作者
REINGANUM, JF
机构
来源
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1983年 / 14卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3003537
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 69
页数:13
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