TIME, SALARY, AND INCENTIVE PAYOFFS IN LABOR CONTRACTS

被引：38

作者：

FAMA, EF

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298257

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：25 / 44

页数：20

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