DISADVANTAGEOUS SEMICOLLUSION

被引：71

作者：

FERSHTMAN, C

GANDAL, N

机构：

[1] TEL AVIV UNIV,DEPT ECON,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,KELLOGG SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60208

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1994年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(94)90010-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Standard analysis in industrial organization indicates that firms earn higher profits if they collude rather than compete on prices (or quantities). However, firms choose other strategic variables, such as investment in capacity or R&D, in addition to choosing prices or production levels. Thus the overall evaluation of product market collusion must take into account its effect on the interaction in the other dimensions. This paper demonstrates that collusion in the product market may yield lower overall profits because it intensifies competition in the other dimensions of the interaction.

引用

页码：141 / 154

页数：14

共 23 条

[1] IS COLLUSION PROFITABLE [J].