BIDDING FOR STUDENTS IN BRITAIN - WHY THE UFC AUCTION FAILED

被引：5

作者：

JOHNES, G

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster

来源：

HIGHER EDUCATION | 1992年 / 23卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00143644

中图分类号：

G40 [教育学];

学科分类号：

040101 ; 120403 ;

摘要：

The economic theory of auctions is used to show that the systems recently introduced in the UK, whereby institutions bid for students, are likely to produce similar bid prices by all institutions. This prediction of theory compares well with the empirical evidence - the first run of the bidding process for universities collapsed when most institutions submitted identical bids.

引用

页码：173 / 182

页数：10

共 13 条

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