MINDS, MEMES, AND RHETORIC

被引：12

作者：

CLARK, SRL

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3BX

来源：

INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 1993年 / 36卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/00201749308602308

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained presents, but does not demonstrate, a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain. If he were correct, realism and methodological individualism would collapse, as would the very enterprise of giving reasons. The metaphors he deploys actually testify to the power of metaphoric imagination that can no more be identified with the metaphors it creates than minds can be identified with memes. That latter equation, of minds with meme-complexes, rests for its meaning on the existence of real minds, which are not to be equated with the thoughts they have. © 1993 Taylor & Francis Group.

引用

页码：3 / 16

页数：14