IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS

[1] [Anonymous], 1979, AGGREG REVEL PREF

[2] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[3] Farquharson R., 1969, THEORY OF VOTING

[4] FEREJOHN JA, 1980, CALTECH300 SOC SCI W

[5] GRETLEIN R, 1979, RELATION FARGUHARSON

[6] OUTCOME FUNCTIONS YIELDING WALRASIAN AND LINDAHL ALLOCATIONS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 217 - 225

[7] CONSTRUCTION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS GUARANTEEING EXISTENCE AND PARETO OPTIMALITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1978, 46 (06) : 1447 - 1474

[8] MASKIN E, 1977, UNPUB MATH OPERATION

[9] SYMMETRIC SPATIAL GAMES WITHOUT MAJORITY-RULE EQUILIBRIA [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1976, 70 (04) : 1172 - 1184

[10] MULTISTAGE GAME REPRESENTATION OF SOPHISTICATED VOTING FOR BINARY PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 18 (01) : 1 - 22

[1] [Anonymous], 1979, AGGREG REVEL PREF

[2] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[3] Farquharson R., 1969, THEORY OF VOTING

[4] FEREJOHN JA, 1980, CALTECH300 SOC SCI W

[5] GRETLEIN R, 1979, RELATION FARGUHARSON

[6] OUTCOME FUNCTIONS YIELDING WALRASIAN AND LINDAHL ALLOCATIONS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 217 - 225

[7] CONSTRUCTION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS GUARANTEEING EXISTENCE AND PARETO OPTIMALITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1978, 46 (06) : 1447 - 1474

[8] MASKIN E, 1977, UNPUB MATH OPERATION

[9] SYMMETRIC SPATIAL GAMES WITHOUT MAJORITY-RULE EQUILIBRIA [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1976, 70 (04) : 1172 - 1184

[10] MULTISTAGE GAME REPRESENTATION OF SOPHISTICATED VOTING FOR BINARY PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 18 (01) : 1 - 22