STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS WITHOUT SINGLEVALUEDNESS

被引：113

作者：

KELLY, JS

机构：

[1] SYRACUSE UNIV,SYRACUSE,NY 13210

[2] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911220

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：439 / 446

页数：8

共 19 条

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[2]

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[4]

Fishburn PC., 1973, THEORY SOCIAL CHOICE

[5]

GARDNER RW, UNPUBLISHED

[6] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J].

GIBBARD, A .

[7]

HURWICZ L, 1973, AM EC REV, V62, P1

PATTANAIK, PK .

PATTANAIK, PK .

[10] STABILITY OF SINCERE VOTING SITUATIONS [J].

PATTANAIK, PK .