LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

被引：268

作者：

SAPPINGTON, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,DEPT ECON,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1 / 21

页数：21

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