INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF BENEVOLENT INTERVENTION - THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT LOAN GUARANTEES

被引:18
作者
CHANEY, PK [1 ]
THAKOR, AV [1 ]
机构
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JL KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(85)90003-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 189
页数:21
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