MUST SELL

被引：6

作者：

CABRAL, L

SAKOVICS, J

机构：

[1] CEPR,P-1000 LISBON,PORTUGAL

[2] CSIC,INST ANAL ECON,E-08193 BARCELONA,SPAIN

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1995年 / 4卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00055.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the ''lemons problem'' in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better off.

引用

页码：55 / 68

页数：14

共 5 条

[1]

AKERLOF G, 1970, Q J ECON, V89, P488

[2] SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH CORRELATED VALUES [J].