DECENTRALIZATION, COMPETITION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF FEDERALISM

被引:12
作者
HAMLIN, AP [1 ]
机构
[1] AND,CRFFR,SAPPORO,JAPAN
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1475-4932.1991.tb02546.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Arguments for the efficiency of federalism typically depend on a decentralization thesis and a competition thesis, both of which relate to mobility. In this essay I shall review and appraise these two lines of argument. I shall suggest that the decentralization thesis is best seen, not as an argument for the efficiency of federalism, but as an efficiency criterion against which models of federalism may be evaluated By contrast, competition and mobility are aspects of the procedural mechanism of federalism which must be supplemented by explicit models of the political process.
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页码:193 / 204
页数:12
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