THE DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLIST AND CONSISTENCY WITH INCREASING COSTS

[1] Bellman R., 1957, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

[2] DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLISTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1982, 90 (02) : 314 - 332

[3] DURABILITY AND MONOPOLY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1972, 15 (01) : 143 - 149

[4] EPPLE D, 1982, JUL NAT BUR EC RES C

[5] ALCOA REVISITED - WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF A SECONDHAND MARKET [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 7 (03) : 254 - 271

[6] KAHN C, 1982, UNPUB DURABLE GOODS

[7] RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION - INCONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL PLANS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1977, 85 (03) : 473 - 491

[8] REINGANUM J, 1981, 508 NW U CTR MATH ST

[9] SEIPER E, 1972, REV EC STUDIES, V40, P333

[10] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400

[1] Bellman R., 1957, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

[2] DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLISTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1982, 90 (02) : 314 - 332

[3] DURABILITY AND MONOPOLY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1972, 15 (01) : 143 - 149

[4] EPPLE D, 1982, JUL NAT BUR EC RES C

[5] ALCOA REVISITED - WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF A SECONDHAND MARKET [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 7 (03) : 254 - 271

[6] KAHN C, 1982, UNPUB DURABLE GOODS

[7] RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION - INCONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL PLANS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1977, 85 (03) : 473 - 491

[8] REINGANUM J, 1981, 508 NW U CTR MATH ST

[9] SEIPER E, 1972, REV EC STUDIES, V40, P333

[10] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400