A SYNTACTIC THEORY OF BELIEF AND ACTION

被引：29

作者：

HAAS, AR

机构：

[1] Bolt Beranek & Newman Inc,, Cambridge, MA, USA, Bolt Beranek & Newman Inc, Cambridge, MA, USA

来源：

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | 1986年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND CYBERNETICS - Cognitive Systems;

D O I：

10.1016/0004-3702(86)90051-2

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

If we assume that beliefs are sentences of first-order logic stored in an agent's head, we can build a simple and intuitively clear formalism for reasoning about beliefs. I apply this formalism to the standard logical problems about belief, and use it to describe the connections between belief and planning.

引用

页码：245 / 292

页数：48

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