IF MARKET CLEARING PRICES ARE SO GOOD THEN WHY DOESNT (ALMOST) ANYBODY WANT THEM

被引：11

作者：

ALEXEEV, M

机构：

[1] George Mason University, Fairfax

来源：

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0147-5967(91)90095-B

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Welfare consequences of retail price reform in a Soviet-type economy are investigated using a queue-rationing model. It is shown that to make every consumer better off market clearing pricing may have to be accompanied by a differential monetary compensation. Such Pareto-improving compensation schemes are virtually impossible to implement given the effects of illegal rents generated by the existing price system and the lack of correlation between these rents and legal incomes. In addition, some other problems with market price reform in a Soviet-type economy are pointed out. © 1991.

引用

页码：380 / 390

页数：11

共 17 条

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