Divisional versus company-wide focus: The trade-off between allocation of managerial attention and screening of talent

被引:20
作者
Darrough, MN [1 ]
Melumad, ND [1 ]
机构
[1] COLUMBIA UNIV,NEW YORK,NY 10027
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2491375
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 94
页数:30
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