DISADVANTAGEOUS SYNDICATES AND STABLE CARTELS - THE CASE OF THE NUCLEOLUS

被引：12

作者：

LEGROS, P

机构：

[1] UNIV PARIS 12, F-94010 CRETEIL, FRANCE

[2] UNIV TUNIS, TUNIS, TUNISIA

[3] NORTHWESTERN UNIV, DEPT MEDS, CHICAGO, IL 60611 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1987年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(87)90101-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：30 / 49

页数：20

共 37 条

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