PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING

[1] PARTY POLICY AND CAMPAIGN COSTS IN A MULTI-CONSTITUENCY MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1981, 37 (03) : 389 - 402

[2] Comanor, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V5, P169

[3] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[4] DIRECTIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (02) : 226 - 239

[5] COUGHLIN P, 1979, APPLIED NONLINEAR AN, P519

[6] EXPECTED PLURALITY VOTING EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (02) : 227 - 233

[7] Hildenbrand W., 1974, CORE EQUILIBRIA LARG

[8] Hinich M.J., 1971, PUBLIC CHOICE, V11, P73, DOI [10.1007/BF01726213, DOI 10.1007/BF01726213]

[9] NONVOTING AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MAJORITY RULE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1972, 4 (02) : 144 - 153

[10] EQUILIBRIUM IN SPATIAL VOTING - MEDIAN VOTER RESULT IS AN ARTIFACT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 16 (02) : 208 - 219

[1] PARTY POLICY AND CAMPAIGN COSTS IN A MULTI-CONSTITUENCY MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1981, 37 (03) : 389 - 402

[2] Comanor, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V5, P169

[3] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) : 113 - 121

[4] DIRECTIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (02) : 226 - 239

[5] COUGHLIN P, 1979, APPLIED NONLINEAR AN, P519

[6] EXPECTED PLURALITY VOTING EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (02) : 227 - 233

[7] Hildenbrand W., 1974, CORE EQUILIBRIA LARG

[8] Hinich M.J., 1971, PUBLIC CHOICE, V11, P73, DOI [10.1007/BF01726213, DOI 10.1007/BF01726213]

[9] NONVOTING AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MAJORITY RULE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1972, 4 (02) : 144 - 153

[10] EQUILIBRIUM IN SPATIAL VOTING - MEDIAN VOTER RESULT IS AN ARTIFACT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 16 (02) : 208 - 219