THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF SENATE VOTING - DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES OR DIFFERENT PRINCIPALS

被引:12
作者
FORT, R [1 ]
HALLAGAN, W [1 ]
MORONG, C [1 ]
STEGNER, T [1 ]
机构
[1] ARKANSAS COLL,DEPT ECON,BATESVILLE,AR 72503
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01049342
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator-specific, ideologically-driven shirking of constituent interest occurs. In this paper, we use a well-known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter-state constituent interests, the role of campaign contributions and, hence, the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection. We find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators. Finally, accounting for inter-state constituent interests, shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection. Thus, it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically-driven shirking.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 57
页数:19
相关论文
共 54 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1973, CONGRESSMEN COMMITTE
[2]   INTEREST-GROUPS, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J].
AUSTENSMITH, D .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1987, 54 (02) :123-139
[3]  
BANKS J, 1989, UNPUB LEGISLATIVE BA
[4]  
Bernstein Robert A., 1981, W POLITICAL Q, V34, P235
[5]  
Buchanan J. M., 1962, CALCULUS CONSENT
[7]  
CHAPPELL HW, 1982, REV ECON STAT, V61, P77
[8]  
COHEN L, 1991, POLITICAL BEHAV, V0013
[9]   A TEST FOR PURE OR APPARENT IDEOLOGY IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTING [J].
DAVIS, ML ;
PORTER, PK .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1989, 60 (02) :101-111
[10]   LEGISLATORS AND INTEREST-GROUPS - HOW UNORGANIZED INTERESTS GET REPRESENTED [J].
DENZAU, AT ;
MUNGER, MC .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (01) :89-106