EXECUTIVE VETO, LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE, AND STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIUM

被引：25

作者：

CARTER, JR

SCHAP, D

机构：

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1987年 / 52卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00116706

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：227 / 244

页数：18

共 29 条

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