DRIFT

被引：12

作者：

BINMORE, K

SAMUELSON, L

机构：

[1] UNIV WISCONSIN, DEPT ECON, 1180 OBSERV DR, MADISON, WI 53706 USA

[2] UNIV LONDON UNIV COLL, DEPT ECON, LONDON WC1E 6BT, ENGLAND

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1994年 / 38卷 / 3-4期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

DRIFT; EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(94)90122-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Which equilibria should command our attention in a game with multiple equilibria? Attempts to solve this equilibrium selection problem have recently turned from the invention of equilibrium refinements to evolutionary models of games. Unfortunately, the basic equilibrium concept for evolutionary games, an evolutionarily stable strategy, frequently fails to exist. In this paper, we examine some of the modified and alternative stability concepts that have been applied when evolutionarily stable strategies do not exist.

引用

页码：859 / 867

页数：9

共 26 条

[1] EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY FINITE AUTOMATA [J].