VOTING COMPETITIONS WITH INTERESTED POLITICIANS - PLATFORMS DO NOT CONVERGE TO THE PREFERENCES OF THE MEDIAN VOTER

被引：36

作者：

HANSSON, I ^{[1
]}

STUART, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SANTA BARBARA, DEPT ECON, SANTA BARBARA, CA 93106 USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1984年 / 44卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00119691

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：431 / 441

页数：11

共 12 条

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