THE POWER OF THE PROPOSAL MAKER IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS AGENDA FORMATION

被引：42

作者：

HARRINGTON, JE

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 21218, MD

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1990年 / 64卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00125914

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a distributive setting, this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous. It is found, not surprisingly, that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage. What is surprising is the degree of this advantage. We find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 - α for an α-majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members. The voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：1 / 20

页数：20

共 23 条

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[3]

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