EFFICIENT RENTS .2. FREE ENTRY AND EFFICIENT RENT SEEKING

被引：87

作者：

HIGGINS, RS ^{[1
]}

SHUGHART, WF ^{[1
]}

TOLLISON, RD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] GEORGE MASON UNIV,CTR STUDY PUBL CHOICE,FAIRFAX,VA 22030

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00124422

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：247 / 258

页数：12

共 13 条

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