学术探索
学术期刊
新闻热点
数据分析
智能评审
立即登录
NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS IN TRANSFERABLE DISCHARGE PERMIT MARKETS - SOME EXTENSIONS
被引:51
作者
:
KEELER, AG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Department of Agricultural Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602
KEELER, AG
机构
:
[1]
Department of Agricultural Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602
来源
:
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
|
1991年
/ 21卷
/ 02期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1016/0095-0696(91)90041-G
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
This paper extends the results of previous research on transferable discharge permit (TDP) markets with noncompliant firms to make a specific comparison between standards and TDP systems when regulatory authorities are unable to achieve full compliance. Particular attention is given to the importance of the shape of the penalty function facing noncompliant firms. The analysis indicates that under plausible penalty functions TDP markets may allow more pollution or a higher fraction of regulated firms out of compliance. These results highlight the importance of implementation in the success of pollution control strategies relying on TDP markets. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:180 / 189
页数:10
相关论文
共 8 条
[1]
FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER IMPERFECTLY ENFORCEABLE POLLUTION STANDARDS AND TAXES
HARFORD, JD
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARFORD, JD
[J].
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT,
1978,
5
(01)
: 26
-
43
[2]
ENFORCEMENT LEVERAGE WHEN PENALTIES ARE RESTRICTED
HARRINGTON, W
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARRINGTON, W
[J].
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1988,
37
(01)
: 29
-
53
[3]
STANDARD SETTING WITH INCOMPLETE ENFORCEMENT REVISITED
JONES, CA
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
JONES, CA
[J].
JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT,
1989,
8
(01)
: 72
-
87
[4]
MALIK A, 1984, THESIS J HOPKINS U B
[5]
MARKETS FOR POLLUTION-CONTROL WHEN FIRMS ARE NONCOMPLIANT
MALIK, AS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Maryland, College Park
MALIK, AS
[J].
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT,
1990,
18
(02)
: 97
-
106
[6]
Russell Clifford S., 1986, ENFORCING POLLUTION
[7]
*US EPA, 1987, ENV LAW REP ADM MAT
[8]
VISCUSI WK, 1979, PUBLIC POLICY, V27, P437
←
1
→
共 8 条
[1]
FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER IMPERFECTLY ENFORCEABLE POLLUTION STANDARDS AND TAXES
HARFORD, JD
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARFORD, JD
[J].
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT,
1978,
5
(01)
: 26
-
43
[2]
ENFORCEMENT LEVERAGE WHEN PENALTIES ARE RESTRICTED
HARRINGTON, W
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
HARRINGTON, W
[J].
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1988,
37
(01)
: 29
-
53
[3]
STANDARD SETTING WITH INCOMPLETE ENFORCEMENT REVISITED
JONES, CA
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
JONES, CA
[J].
JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT,
1989,
8
(01)
: 72
-
87
[4]
MALIK A, 1984, THESIS J HOPKINS U B
[5]
MARKETS FOR POLLUTION-CONTROL WHEN FIRMS ARE NONCOMPLIANT
MALIK, AS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Maryland, College Park
MALIK, AS
[J].
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT,
1990,
18
(02)
: 97
-
106
[6]
Russell Clifford S., 1986, ENFORCING POLLUTION
[7]
*US EPA, 1987, ENV LAW REP ADM MAT
[8]
VISCUSI WK, 1979, PUBLIC POLICY, V27, P437
←
1
→