UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] WAGES AS SORTING MECHANISMS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - A THEORY OF TESTING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1980, 47 (04) : 653 - 664

[3] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259

[4] HART OD, 1980, 29 U CAMBR EC THEOR

[5] Leibenstein Harvey, 1957, EC BACKWARDNESS EC G

[6] LOASBY BJ, 1976, CHOICE COMPLEXITY IG

[7] PERSONAL AND JOB CHARACTERISTICS AS DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE-FIRM CONTRACT STRUCTURE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 93 (02) : 255 - 279

[8] SIMON HA, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P493

[9] STIGLITZ JE, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P393

[10] INCENTIVES, RISK, AND INFORMATION - NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY OF HIERARCHY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (02): : 552 - 579

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] WAGES AS SORTING MECHANISMS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - A THEORY OF TESTING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1980, 47 (04) : 653 - 664

[3] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259

[4] HART OD, 1980, 29 U CAMBR EC THEOR

[5] Leibenstein Harvey, 1957, EC BACKWARDNESS EC G

[6] LOASBY BJ, 1976, CHOICE COMPLEXITY IG

[7] PERSONAL AND JOB CHARACTERISTICS AS DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE-FIRM CONTRACT STRUCTURE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 93 (02) : 255 - 279

[8] SIMON HA, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P493

[9] STIGLITZ JE, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P393

[10] INCENTIVES, RISK, AND INFORMATION - NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY OF HIERARCHY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (02): : 552 - 579