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EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR QUEUES WITH IMPATIENT CUSTOMERS

被引：45
作者：
HASSIN, R
HAVIV, M
机构：
[1] UNIV SYDNEY, DEPT ECONOMETR, SYDNEY, NSW 2006, AUSTRALIA
[2] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, DEPT STAT, IL-91905 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 1995年 / 17卷 / 01期
关键词：
BALKING AND RENEGING; QUEUES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I：
10.1016/0167-6377(94)00049-C
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We consider a memoryless queue in which the reward of service completion for an individual reduces to zero after some time. Customers, while comparing expected holding costs and the rewards have to decide if to join the system at all and if they do when to renege. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which each of the customers joins with some probability and reneges as soon as the reward is zero.
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页码：41 / 45
页数：5
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