OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MANY AGENTS

[1] Aumann R., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, V4, P287, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-018

[2] NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 8 (02) : 235 - 247

[3] INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES - THE AGENCY INFORMATION PROBLEM [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (03) : 373 - 390

[4] Green J. R., 1983, J POLITICAL EC, P349

[5] GROSSMAN S, 1983, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P7

[6] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[7] HOLMSTROM B, 1979, BELL J EC SPR, P79

[8] Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[9] MOOKHERJEE D, 1982, ICERD8257 LOND SCH E

[10] PRIZES AND INCENTIVES - TOWARDS A GENERAL-THEORY OF COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 21 - 43

[1] Aumann R., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, V4, P287, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-018

[2] NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 8 (02) : 235 - 247

[3] INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES - THE AGENCY INFORMATION PROBLEM [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (03) : 373 - 390

[4] Green J. R., 1983, J POLITICAL EC, P349

[5] GROSSMAN S, 1983, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P7

[6] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[7] HOLMSTROM B, 1979, BELL J EC SPR, P79

[8] Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[9] MOOKHERJEE D, 1982, ICERD8257 LOND SCH E

[10] PRIZES AND INCENTIVES - TOWARDS A GENERAL-THEORY OF COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 21 - 43