CONTRACT THEORY AND ECONOMIC-ORGANIZATION - GATHERING INFORMATION BEFORE THE CONTRACT IS OFFERED - THE CASE WITH 2 STATES OF NATURE

被引：27

作者：

CREMER, J

KHALIL, F

机构：

[1] UNIV TOULOUSE 1,IDEI,F-31042 TOULOUSE,FRANCE

[2] UNIV WASHINGTON,DEPT ECON,SEATTLE,WA 98195

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1994年 / 38卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

CONTRACTS; INFORMATION; GATHERING INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(94)90102-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Focusing on a Baron-Myerson model with two states of nature, in the first part of the paper, we study the contract that a principal would offer to an agent when he does not know whether the agent is informed or not about the state of nature. In the second, we endogenize the information of acquisition, and show that in equilibrium a Baron-Myerson type contract will never be offered.

引用

页码：675 / 682

页数：8