FRAMING EFFECTS AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE ASPECT OF INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING

The earliest studies of negotiator framing effects demonstrated the benefits of positive framing of issues. However, several recent empirical studies and game theoretic models of bargaining contradict these findings. This paper seeks to develop a comprehensive explanation of the role of framing that will reconcile the various results. Because of the conflict between integrative and distributive aspects of bargaining, negotiators must confront a dilemma. Risk attitude and framing affect the approach negotiators take in dealing with the dilemma. Contrary to the view taken in the early framing studies, negatively framed bargainers should generally do better than their positively framed counterparts in most situations. However, a pair of positively framed bargainers should reach more integrative settlements than a pair of negatively framed bargainers. Two experiments are reported that tested these propositions. In each case the predictions were strongly supported. The implications of these results for theorists and negotiators are discussed. © 1993 Academic Press, Inc.