A DOWNSIAN SPATIAL MODEL WITH PARTY ACTIVISM

[1] ALDRICH JH, 1983, N DIMENSIONAL GENERA

[2] ALDRICH JH, PUBLIC CHOICE

[3] ARANSON PH, 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[4] INCENTIVE SYSTEMS - A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS [J]. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1961, 6 (02) : 129 - 166

[5] Coleman James S., 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[6] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] PARADOX OF NOT VOTING - DECISION THEORETIC ANALYSIS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1974, 68 (02) : 525 - 536

[9] DYNAMICAL MODEL OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 16 (02) : 310 - 334

[10] ISSUE CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AMONG PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1960, 54 (02) : 406 - 427

[1] ALDRICH JH, 1983, N DIMENSIONAL GENERA

[2] ALDRICH JH, PUBLIC CHOICE

[3] ARANSON PH, 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[4] INCENTIVE SYSTEMS - A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS [J]. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1961, 6 (02) : 129 - 166

[5] Coleman James S., 1972, PROBABILITY MODELS C

[6] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] PARADOX OF NOT VOTING - DECISION THEORETIC ANALYSIS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1974, 68 (02) : 525 - 536

[9] DYNAMICAL MODEL OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 16 (02) : 310 - 334

[10] ISSUE CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AMONG PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1960, 54 (02) : 406 - 427