ECONOMIC-EVALUATION OF VOTING POWER OF COMMON-STOCK

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] Berle A., 1932, MODERN CORPORATION P

[3] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) : 288 - 307

[4] TAKEOVER BIDS, THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM, AND THE THEORY OF THE CORPORATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 11 (01): : 42 - 64

[5] THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) : 305 - 360

[6] LEASE RC, 1981, MARKET VALUE CONTROL

[7] LEVY H, 1978, STOCK EXCHANGE

[8] MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE-CONTROL [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1965, 73 (02) : 110 - 120

[9] MANNE HG, 1964, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V64, P534

[10] MIDGLEY K, 1974, LLOYDS BANK REV OCT, P24

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] Berle A., 1932, MODERN CORPORATION P

[3] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) : 288 - 307

[4] TAKEOVER BIDS, THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM, AND THE THEORY OF THE CORPORATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 11 (01): : 42 - 64

[5] THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) : 305 - 360

[6] LEASE RC, 1981, MARKET VALUE CONTROL

[7] LEVY H, 1978, STOCK EXCHANGE

[8] MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE-CONTROL [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1965, 73 (02) : 110 - 120

[9] MANNE HG, 1964, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V64, P534

[10] MIDGLEY K, 1974, LLOYDS BANK REV OCT, P24