MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL

被引：214

作者：

MYERSON, RB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912116

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1767 / 1797

页数：31

共 27 条

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