FACTORS AFFECTING CO-OPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA

[1] BERELSON B, 1964, HUMAN BEHAVIOR INVEN

[2] BISHOP RL, 1960, AM ECON REV, V50, P933

[3] Deutsch M., 1962, NEBRASKA S MOTIVATIO, P275

[4] FOURAKER LE, 1963, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

[5] AN EMPIRICAL-APPROACH TO THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1962, 76 (03) : 424 - 436

[6] LAVE LB, 1960, THESIS REED COLLEGE

[7] Luce R. D., 1957, GAMES DECISIONS INTR

[8] Schelling T., 1960, STRATEGY CONFLICT

[9] SCODEL A, 1962, J CONFLICT RESOL, V6, P334

[10] Siegel S., 1960, BARGAINING GROUP DEC

[1] BERELSON B, 1964, HUMAN BEHAVIOR INVEN

[2] BISHOP RL, 1960, AM ECON REV, V50, P933

[3] Deutsch M., 1962, NEBRASKA S MOTIVATIO, P275

[4] FOURAKER LE, 1963, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

[5] AN EMPIRICAL-APPROACH TO THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1962, 76 (03) : 424 - 436

[6] LAVE LB, 1960, THESIS REED COLLEGE

[7] Luce R. D., 1957, GAMES DECISIONS INTR

[8] Schelling T., 1960, STRATEGY CONFLICT

[9] SCODEL A, 1962, J CONFLICT RESOL, V6, P334

[10] Siegel S., 1960, BARGAINING GROUP DEC