THE ECONOMICS OF BREAKDOWNS, CHECKUPS, AND CURES

被引:67
作者
TAYLOR, CR
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261975
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: ''health,'' ''disease,'' or ''failure,'' Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements.
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页码:53 / 74
页数:22
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