AUCTIONING THE PROVISION OF AN INDIVISIBLE PUBLIC GOOD

被引：17

作者：

KLEINDORFER, PR ^{[1
]}

SERTEL, MR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BOGAZICI UNIV,DEPT ECON,ISTANBUL 80815,TURKEY

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1994年 / 64卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1994.1052

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A ''community'' of n agents must determine which of its members should provide an indivisible public good. Each of the agents can provide the public good, but the provision cost varies among the agents. We identify here an efficient solution concept for such problems and design a class of auction-like mechanisms, each of which Nash implements (and under appropriate domain restrictions fully Nash implements) this. The mechanisms are in the spirit of ''kth lowest bidder'' auctions.

引用

页码：20 / 34

页数：15

共 12 条

[1] VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN ITERATIVELY UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - COMPLETE INFORMATION [J].