A SIMPLIFIED BARGAINING MODEL FOR THE NORMAL-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAME

[1] A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1952, 38 (10) : 886 - 893

[2] Harsanyi J.C., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, P325

[3] APPROACHES TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM BEFORE AND AFTER THE THEORY OF GAMES - A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ZEUTHENS, HICKS, AND NASHS THEORIES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1956, 24 (02) : 144 - 157

[4] ISBELL J, 1960, B AM MATH SOC, V66, P70

[5] Luce R. D., 1957, GAMES DECISIONS INTR

[6] TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1953, 21 (01) : 128 - 140

[7] THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1950, 18 (02) : 155 - 162

[8] Shapley L, 1953, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, VII, P307, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400881970-018

[1] A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1952, 38 (10) : 886 - 893

[2] Harsanyi J.C., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, P325

[3] APPROACHES TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM BEFORE AND AFTER THE THEORY OF GAMES - A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ZEUTHENS, HICKS, AND NASHS THEORIES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1956, 24 (02) : 144 - 157

[4] ISBELL J, 1960, B AM MATH SOC, V66, P70

[5] Luce R. D., 1957, GAMES DECISIONS INTR

[6] TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1953, 21 (01) : 128 - 140

[7] THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1950, 18 (02) : 155 - 162

[8] Shapley L, 1953, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, VII, P307, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400881970-018