TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM PARADOXES

被引:30
作者
CATONI, S [1 ]
PALLOTTINO, S [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV PISA, DEPT COMP SCI, I-56125 PISA, ITALY
关键词
D O I
10.1287/trsc.25.3.240
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Paradoxes may occur when different traffic equilibrium models are applied starting from the same data. When in the traffic system 'players' of different size are present, a Mixed Behavior Equilibrium can be stated. One should expect, by intuition, that total cost decreases with the reduction of noncooperative players on the network. This assumption does not hold in general. This paper provides numerical examples to show it. The problem of investigating the relationship between different equilibrium models arises when one considers a strategy for rerouting vehicles in road networks, in order to reduce congestion (Route Guidance Systems, for example). The importance of identifying paradoxical situations in such problems is briefly discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:240 / 244
页数:5
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