SALARIES AND PIECE RATES

[1] BONIN JP, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P682

[2] FAN LS, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P226

[3] FREIXAS X, 1983, PLANNING INCOMPLETE

[4] A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) : 349 - 364

[5] HARRIS M, REV EC STUDIES

[6] HARRIS M, 1981, TENURE PHENOMENON JO

[7] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[8] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284

[9] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[10] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606

[1] BONIN JP, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P682

[2] FAN LS, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P226

[3] FREIXAS X, 1983, PLANNING INCOMPLETE

[4] A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) : 349 - 364

[5] HARRIS M, REV EC STUDIES

[6] HARRIS M, 1981, TENURE PHENOMENON JO

[7] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[8] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284

[9] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[10] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606