INFORMATION PATTERNS AND NASH EQUILIBRIA IN EXTENSIVE GAMES .1.

[1] INFORMATION CONDITIONS, COMMUNICATION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (02) : 186 - 189

[2] DUBEY P, 1982, COWLES F DISCUSSION, V625

[3] SOME REMARKS ON THE FOLK THEOREM IN GAME-THEORY [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1982, 3 (03) : 281 - 290

[4] KANEKO M, 1983, MATH SOC SCI, V5, P233

[5] KANEKO M, 1981, COWLES F DISCUSSION, V601

[6] Kuhn H. W., 1953, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, V28, P193

[7] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 21 (01) : 1 - 9

[1] INFORMATION CONDITIONS, COMMUNICATION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (02) : 186 - 189

[2] DUBEY P, 1982, COWLES F DISCUSSION, V625

[3] SOME REMARKS ON THE FOLK THEOREM IN GAME-THEORY [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1982, 3 (03) : 281 - 290

[4] KANEKO M, 1983, MATH SOC SCI, V5, P233

[5] KANEKO M, 1981, COWLES F DISCUSSION, V601

[6] Kuhn H. W., 1953, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, V28, P193

[7] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 21 (01) : 1 - 9