INSIDE TRADING AND INCENTIVES

[1] BERGE C, 1966, TOPOLOGICAL SPACES

[2] DEMSETZ H, 1969, EC POLICY REGULATION

[3] DYE R, 1983, J ACCOUNTING RES AUT, P514

[4] EASTERBROOK FH, 1982, SUP CT REV, P309

[5] INFORMATION AND CAPITAL MARKETS [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1971, 44 (03) : 289 - 298

[6] OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIUM WHEN MARKET STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 11 (03) : 418 - 443

[7] HIRSHLEIFER J, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P561

[8] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[9] LEFTWICH R, 1981, CRSP63 U CHIC CTR RE

[10] Manne Henry G, 1966, INSIDER TRADING STOC

[1] BERGE C, 1966, TOPOLOGICAL SPACES

[2] DEMSETZ H, 1969, EC POLICY REGULATION

[3] DYE R, 1983, J ACCOUNTING RES AUT, P514

[4] EASTERBROOK FH, 1982, SUP CT REV, P309

[5] INFORMATION AND CAPITAL MARKETS [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1971, 44 (03) : 289 - 298

[6] OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIUM WHEN MARKET STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 11 (03) : 418 - 443

[7] HIRSHLEIFER J, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P561

[8] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[9] LEFTWICH R, 1981, CRSP63 U CHIC CTR RE

[10] Manne Henry G, 1966, INSIDER TRADING STOC