COOPERATION IN ONGOING ORGANIZATIONS

[1] ABREU D, 1984, 1083 HARV I EC RES D

[2] [Anonymous], 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M

[3] IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (06) : 1183 - 1202

[4] Benoit J.-P., 1984, FINITELY REPEATED GA

[5] Friedman J., 1977, OLIGOPOLY THEORY GAM

[6] FRIEDMAN JW, 1983, TRIGGER STRATEGY EQU

[7] HAMMOND P, 1975, ALTRUISM MORALITY EC, P115

[8] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[9] INMAN RP, 1983, MARKETS GOVT NEW POL

[10] 2ND-BEST NATIONAL SAVING AND GAME-EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1968, 35 (02) : 185 - 199

[1] ABREU D, 1984, 1083 HARV I EC RES D

[2] [Anonymous], 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M

[3] IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1975, 83 (06) : 1183 - 1202

[4] Benoit J.-P., 1984, FINITELY REPEATED GA

[5] Friedman J., 1977, OLIGOPOLY THEORY GAM

[6] FRIEDMAN JW, 1983, TRIGGER STRATEGY EQU

[7] HAMMOND P, 1975, ALTRUISM MORALITY EC, P115

[8] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[9] INMAN RP, 1983, MARKETS GOVT NEW POL

[10] 2ND-BEST NATIONAL SAVING AND GAME-EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1968, 35 (02) : 185 - 199