EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：335

作者：

HOLMSTROM, B ^{[1
]}

MYERSON, RB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1983年 / 51卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912117

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：1799 / 1819

页数：21

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