A CLASS OF DOMINANCE SOLVABLE COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS

[1] [Anonymous], GAME THEORY SOCIAL S

[2] BLACKWELL D, 1952, 2ND P BERK S MATH ST

[3] MATTHEWS S, 1984, BAYESIAN MODELS EC T

[4] MATTHEWS SA, 1977, INFORMATION ACQUISIT

[5] RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS, INFORMATION ACQUISITION, AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (04) : 921 - 943

[6] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[7] Moulin H., 1983, STRATEGY SOCIAL CHOI

[8] COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1961, 16 (01) : 8 - 37

[9] BIDDING MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (03) : 511 - 518

[1] [Anonymous], GAME THEORY SOCIAL S

[2] BLACKWELL D, 1952, 2ND P BERK S MATH ST

[3] MATTHEWS S, 1984, BAYESIAN MODELS EC T

[4] MATTHEWS SA, 1977, INFORMATION ACQUISIT

[5] RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS, INFORMATION ACQUISITION, AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (04) : 921 - 943

[6] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[7] Moulin H., 1983, STRATEGY SOCIAL CHOI

[8] COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1961, 16 (01) : 8 - 37

[9] BIDDING MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (03) : 511 - 518