SYMMETRICALLY PAIRWISE-BARGAINED ALLOCATIONS IN AN ASSIGNMENT MARKET

被引：56

作者：

ROCHFORD, SC

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(84)90144-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：262 / 281

页数：20

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