HOW TO PAY FOR THE PEACE - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK WITH REFERENCES TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

被引：65

作者：

AZAM, JP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CSAE,OXFORD,ENGLAND

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1995年 / 83卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01047691

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyses a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some ''gifts'' to his opponents, as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures. However, if the government is a Stackelberg-leader, then he will use the ''gift'' as a tool in his policy for staying in power.

引用

页码：173 / 184

页数：12