THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY IN THE FIRM

被引:4
作者
KATZNER, DW
机构
[1] University of Massachusetts, Amherst
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0167-2681(92)90069-N
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the general properties of hierarchical authority structures in the firm and, in addition, to extend some of Beckmann's work on rank in organizations. Such things as the distinction between rank and 'level' are clarified, and the effect of the number of ranks, the span of control, and the wage ratio between successive ranks, on structures of authority, on the efficiency of those structures, on the operating cost of the firm, and on its profit, are studied.
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页码:41 / 67
页数:27
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